who share the same theological views and have similar notions about natural philosophy, or individuals whose disagreements in religion are paralleled by scientific differences. One must find causal connections to make any:kind of an argument, and the causal links are hard to come by. In fact, I have maintained elsewhere that for Catholicism, at least, a meaningful connection between the Catholic faith and the nature of Catholic science has yet to be demonstrated (Ashworth 1986 ). But I remain hopeful, and I would like here to enhance the search for connections between science and religion by increasing the data base, so to speak. I wish to address a body of material in which very few scholars -Mertonians or non-Mertonians -seem interested, and that is the metaphorical imagery of seventeenth-century science. In particular, I would like to focus on two specific metaphorical images, the Light of Reason and the Light of Nature, and to argue that Catholic and Protestant scientists used these images in different ways, revealing divergent attitudes toward sense experience and the world of nature. I will not be able to demonstrate that these variations in imagery had any impact whatsoever on the course of the Scientific Revolution. But if and when a valid thesis should emerge that links the complex rise of modern science with specific Christian doctrines, I would hope that the iconography of the issue would play an important part. 
Catholic Images of Reason, the Intellect, and the Senses
The images with which I am concerned are found primarily on the engraved title pages or frontispieces that introduce many seventeenth-century works of science. Some of these title pages are quite familiar, such as those that preface Galileo's Dialogo or Bacon's Novum Organum. But it is not often realized how widespread title-page illustrations were, or that they employ a visual language that is often quite specific to the books they adorn and the issues there addressed. As an introduction to both the genre and the specific metaphorical images that are to be our subject, I would like to examine the iconography of the title page of Bartolomeo Amici's commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo, published in 1626 . 2 Amici was a Jesuit philosopher who is little known today, although Edward Grant recently resurrected him in a discussion of seventeenth-century scholastic cosmology (Grant 1984) . But Amici's title page is a wonderful visual introduction to Thomistic views of reason, sense, and human knowledge (see fig. 1 ).
The figure standing at the left is Pan, or Nature, and he represents common sense. We know that much with certitude, because the label "sensus communis" appears beneath. He bares his breast in a rather extreme fashion, revealing a pastoral nature scene within. Common sense, in the Thomistic scheme, is the first of the interior senses, responsible for uniting sense impressions and conveying them to the imagination. Common sense has no faculty of abstraction and can grasp only particulars; the choice of Pan as personification seems apt. As we peer into Pan's heart, we are reminded that according to Aristotle the heart is the seat of the common sensorium.
3
Opposite Pan stands none other than Intellectus Agens, the Agent Intellect. Were the label missing, we could still identify the figure by its attributes, since according to Ripa's Iconologia (the standard Renaissance handbook of personifications) a figure wearing a crown and accompanied by an eagle must be Intelleto (Ripa 1611, 258) . The agent intellect, according to Thomas Aquinas, is that part of reason which is responsible for making sense experience intelligible and conveying it to the passive intellect. It allows us to know changeable things unchangeably, and discern objects from their likenesses. There are two especially interesting features about this particular personification. First, Agent Intellect holds a mirror, which shows the very same scene that is revealed in the chest of Pan. The mirror represents phantasia, or imagination, which according to Avicenna is mirrorlike and mediates between the external senses and reason (Summers 1987, 96-100) . Second, Agent Intellect basks in the glow of some external illumination. This is our Light of Reason.
The Light of Reason metaphor has its ultimate source in Aristotle, who had commented in the De Anima that the agent intellect is like a light (1931, 430a) . Thomas Aquinas adopted the image enthusiastically and converted it from a simile to a metaphor. It is the light of the agent intellect, says Aquinas, that makes the phantasms of the senses intelligible.
Pursuing the metaphor further, he says that the intellectual light itself is nothing other than a participated likeness of the uncreated light. We achieve certain knowledge because the light of his countenance is upon us (Aquinas 1945, 1.79.4-5 ). Amici's image captures all of these Thomistic nuances, suggesting that the agent intellect is the divine light within, and that without God's help we would not be able to achieve understanding. 4 Before attempting to assess the impact of such an epistemology on seventeenthcentury science, let us examine a second title page, this one from a work that is even less scientific than Amici's, being a set of disputations by Roderigo Arriaga on the theology of Thomas Aquinas (Arriaga 1643) . 5 Arriaga was also a Jesuit, professor at the University at Prague for some years and then for many more its chancellor. 6 The title page is in some ways less accessible than that of Amici, but for that very reason quite a bit richer in its imagery (see fig. 2 ). God dominates the scene, as he should. Seated on a throne and surrounded by various emblematic cherubs, he rests his foot on the earth, evoking Isaiah 66:1: "Thus saith the Lord, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool." Two beams of light descend from God. The one on the left illuminates a radiant figure with a sun on his or her breast; the beam carries the words "In Lumine tuo videbimus lumen" (In your light we shall see light) from Psalm 36:10. The figure probably represents Contemplation, the highest of the human faculties, although the motif of the sun on the breast is also characteristic of Virtue. On the right are two figures. The larger wears a veil, a characteristic attribute of Religion or Theology, and the light beam says "Fide Magistra" (guided by faith). She is writing, and holding her inkpot is a very youthful Reason, identified by a sash that says "ratione ministra" (assisted by reason). Reason is literally here the handmaiden to Theology, but interestingly, neither has anything to do with Contemplation's direct experience of the divine. To emphasize this point, the artist places below the standing figures two vignettes; the one on the right, below Theology, shows a cherub trying to observe the sun by reflection, with the motto "Nunc in Aenigmate" (now obscured) while below Contemplation is an eagle observing the sun directly, with the motto "Tune facie ad faciem" (then face to face). The mottoes are, of course, from 1 Corinthians 13, and the title page leaves the carefully crafted impression that Reason and Theology look through a glass darkly, whereas Contemplation sees God face to face.
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The allegorical title pages of the Amici and Arriaga works have rather different aims; one compares sense to reason, the other compares reason and faith to the beatitude of the divine vision. But there are similarities in the messages conveyed. Both suggest the importance of illumination in achieving certain knowledge. Both downplay the importance of sense experience and the evidence of nature in establishing truth. Neither, however, seems to be specifically addressing the question of scientific knowledge. To find that question explicitly raised, we may turn to a more familiar work by a better-known scientist -Rosa Ursina (1626-30) by Christoph Scheiner. He too was a Jesuit, and in the fifteen years before writing this book he had been involved in a bitter and protracted controversy with Galileo -ostensibly over comets and sunspots, but at a deeper level over the place of sense experience in scientific knowledge. In the frontispiece to his book, Scheiner seems to have formalized his epistemological views in an unforgettable visual display (see fig. 3 ).
The Rosa Ursina is a book on sunspots, and, not surprisingly, Sun is the central image, blemished with spots and surrounded by the petals of a rose -one of the devices of Scheiner's patrons, the Orsini family. The sun serves iconographically here as a source of light, and it is counterpoised to another source of illumination at the top, Divine Light. Two beams emanate from each of these sources, and together they represent what we might call the four lights. The ray at top left, which descends from the Glory, is the Light of Sacred Authority, or Scripture; the ray at top right, from the same divine source, is the Light of Reason. The sun also is a source of light, and hence truth; but it is, quite literally, truth of a lower order. At bottom left, we see the Light of Profane Authority, and at bottom right the Light of Sense.
Before looking at these images more closely, we should note the origin of the four-lights metaphor, for it does not stem from either Aristotle or Aquinas but rather from Bonaventure. In his Retracing the Arts to Theology, Bonaventure distinguished four lights: (1) the light of mechanical art, which he also calls the external light; (2) the light of sense perception, or the lower light; (3) the light of philosophical knowledge, or inner light; and (4) the light of sacred Scripture, or higher light. The last has its source directly in God, the Father of Lights (Bonaventure 1960-70, 3:13-20) . Bonaventure immediately proceeded to complicate his metaphor by subdividing and then redefining his lights, so Scheiner did not hesitate to run the lights through his own prism, substituting profane authority for the mechanical arts, and modulating philosophy into reason. He also drew on his Thomistic heritage and provided reason with divine illumination. The net result is a remarkable epistemological image. Scheiner was clearly telling us (and Galileo) that sense evidence is inferior to the more certain knowledge of reason and Scripture.
Scheiner underscored this point with a delicious -indeed malicious -touch. His Light of Sense is represented emblematically by the telescope, which is casting fuzzy images of sunspots on a piece of paper. By themselves, these sensory images produce only confusion. If we now look at the higher Light of Reason, we see that the eye is directing the hand to draw sunspots on another piece of paper, and these sunspots are crisp and clear. Reason alone, says Scheiner, allows us to comprehend the new phenomena of the heavens; observation by itself will never lead to complete understanding. 8 Scheiner's image of the four lights was appealing to his fellow Jesuit scientists, since it captured so well the Jesuit belief that the evidence of the senses, unless illuminated by reason and natural philosophy, is insufficient to contradict Scripture, especially as concerns the mobility of the earth.
9 Fifteen years after Scheiner created his visual metaphor, Athanasius Kircher resurrected it for the title page of his treatise on optics, the Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae of 1646 (see cover illustration of this issue of Science in Context). Most of the elements of that engraving are quite different from these of Scheiner, but the four lights are retained, placed exactly where Scheiner had placed them. Kircher robbed Reason of some of its splendor by snuffing out the divine light, which was reserved for Scripture alone; but he still presented Reason as superior to Sense. He also preserved Scheiner's emblem for Sense, the telescope; and like Scheiner's, Kircher's telescope fails utterly as a solitary source of knowledge.
These four title pages, taken collectively, present an interesting view of Jesuit epistemology in the age of Galileo. Several of them suggest that reason is the ultimate source of scientific knowledge, since it is divinely inspired. Several suggest that reason is still only a handmaiden. And all of them give a minor or nonexistent role to sense experience. To a Scholastic, sense evidence was important; without it there could be no knowledge. But sense evidence by itself provides only phantasms, cloudy images that are the source of confusion rather than light. The assistance of divine light is required to make sense of the senses, to produce understanding in the intellect.
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There is a limit, however, to what such metaphors can tell us about Catholic science. They tell us a great deal about Jesuit science, but there were a number of Catholic scientists who would and did disagree with such an interpretation of sense evidence: Galileo is the obvious candidate; but we could also include Pierre Gassendi, Marin Mersenne, Rene Descartes, and a host of others. So this placing in opposition of the Light of Reason and the Light of Sense should not really be portrayed as a particularly Catholic attitude. Nevertheless, it is interesting that about the same time a number of Protestant scientists were employing similar-appearing light metaphors of their own, but ones that were rather differently polarized. Let us consider one of them.
Protestant Images of Grace and Nature
Oswald Croll's Basilica Chymica was published in 1609, in the last year of his life. It proved to be one of the most influential alchemical tracts of the century, going through numerous editions and inspiring a great deal of discussion, pro and con. Croll was a Calvinist, and indeed he worked in a field that was to become an almost exclusively Protestant domain. Most of the expanse of his title page (see fig. 4 ) is taken up by portrait vignettes of Hermes, Roger Bacon, and others; but for us the relevant images are the circular diagrams at top and bottom center. The top emblem is identified as the Light of Grace, and it comprises the Trinity -Father, Son, and Holy Spirit -surrounded by the angelic orders. The lower device is more interesting, since it is an emblematic novelty; it is the Light of Nature. It includes various trinities of its own-the three kingdoms, animal, vegetable, and mineral; three elements, air, fire, and water; the triad of soul, body, and spirit; and the symbols for the alchemical triaprima, sulfur, mercury, and salt. It is noteworthy that the tiny alchemist to the left of the emblem is bathing directly in the light of Christ Incarnate (Hannaway 1975 , plate I).
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These certainly form an intriguing pair of images, quite different from the scholastic metaphors we have been looking at, and it behoves us to ask from whence they came. Fortunately, most of the spade work in this case has already been done by Owen Hannaway in his perceptive study of Croll and Andreas Libavius. The metaphor of the two lights, Grace and Nature, originated with Paracelsus. The path to salvation, for Paracelsus, was illuminated by the Light of Grace, and the guide for that path was Scripture. The path to knowledge in this world was illuminated by the Light of Nature, and the guide was the Book of Nature. Although Paracelsus in his early years seems to have placed the Light of Nature in a secondary role (salvation of the soul is more important than healing the body), by the time of his Astronomia Magna (1537), he seems to have given both lights an equal status in their own realms. And interestingly, both are divine. The Light of Nature is God's gift to man. As Paracelsus put it: "The Father has set us in the light of nature, and the Son in the eternal light. Therefore it is indispensable that we should know them both" (Hannaway 1975, 6-8; quotation, p. 8).
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The Light of Nature is a striking metaphor because it elevates the study of nature to a new plane, and it totally ignores the role of the intervening faculties that occupied Aristotle and his commentators. When Paracelsianism underwent its Protestant revival in the early seventeenth century, the doctrine of the two lights became a popular device, both as a poetic metaphor and as a visual image. In the lengthy preface to his book, Croll himself emphasizes the importance of the two lights depicted on his title page. The Light of Nature, he says, makes a true philosopher, and the Light of Grace begets a true theologian, and in these two lights we are to walk and spend our short time, as he puts it (Hannaway 1975,9) . Subsequent chemical and alchemical writers found the concept equally attractive. Johann Daniel Mylius, who was a member of the alchemical circle that included Michael Maier, took both Croll emblems as starting points and elaborated them considerably for the title page (not illustrated here) to his Opus Medico-Chymicum (1618).
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The Light of Grace emblem has become unrecognizable and seems now to represent the Light of the Occult; but the Light of Nature device is much as Croll conceived it, with some additions. The additions are interesting. Around the outer rim is the phrase "Omnia ab uno, omnia in uno, omnia per unum" (All from one, all in one, all through one) -obviously, elements of the Light of Grace have been incorporated into the Light of Nature here. And on either side kneel the alchemist Hermes and the physician Hippocrates, in the act of prayer, illuminated by God while investigating nature. This is a different, and most effective, way of representing the Calvinist belief that the Light of Nature, because its source lies in God, provides certain truth. Ars Vitraria Experimentalis of 1679 (see fig. 5 ). In the genre of title-page engraving, this is High Baroque overkill -one needs a magnifying glass to read all the tiny labels -but the elements of interest to us are reasonably evident. The ultimate source of all knowledge is Lux Veritatis, the Light of Truth, at upper left. Mind uses the lens of Reason to focus that light and kindle Lumen Naturae, the Light of Nature (it is of interest that the medieval distinction between lux and lumen is preserved here). Experience then uses the Light of Nature to turn wisdom into scientia (knowledge). 14 A rather novel exercise in epistemology is reflected in Kunckel's engraving. The Light of Grace is nowhere to be seen. Reason is not a light now, but an agent; and it is Experience that ultimately produces truth, employing the Light of Nature. Reason does not operate on sense evidence; Experience does. Knowledge, by the later seventeenth century, has become a product of the laboratory.
It would be presumptuous to make a trend out of Croll, Mylius, and Kunckel, but it is intriguing that all three were Protestants, and all, with their light metaphors, extolled the Light of Nature more than the Light of Reason. It is even more interesting that when one studies other title-page motifs -such as "Nature Revealed," or "Mother Earth" 15 -one discovers that when nature is being exalted as the source of truth, the author, far more often than not, is Protestant.
There was one other Protestant variation of the two lights metaphor that was completely divorced from the alchemical tradition, and we might call it the Baconian, since it seems to have originated with the Novum Organum (1620). It is well known that Bacon was quite fond of light metaphors, especially in his discussions of Experiments of Light and Experiments of Fruit. On the title page to his Sylva Sylvarum (1629) he used a light motif in a very unusual way (see fig. 6 ). 16 An illuminating flash descends from the divine glory, accompanied by a quotation from Genesis ("And God saw the light, that it was good"), and this light shines on an indistinct globe, identified as the Mundus Intellectualis (globe of the intellect). It seems at first glance as if Bacon is extolling the Light of Reason in a way very similar to that in Jesuit imagery.
But when one reads the Novum organum, from which the emblem of the intellectual globe derives, it is clear that Bacon's light is something quite different. For Bacon, the light of the intellect comes up from the senses. To derive truth from nature, one must in fact silence the intellect and focus on the facts of nature, "receiving the images simply as they are." Bacon's most widely used metaphor for the intellect is an uneven mirror, which distorts the rays of the senses. The senses themselves contribute much less error, and these errors can be sorted out. So by his intellectual light, Bacon actually means the "Light of Nature and Experience," which is the phrase he most often employs when discussing the pursuit of certain truth. When God gave man his intellectual light, he gave man the ability to ascertain truth by induction from observations gathered from nature. Bacon truly saw reason in a new light (Bacon 1620, preface, aphorism 1:55, 74) .
It is tempting to see in this Protestant, alchemical, Baconian insistence on the primacy of nature some deep significance, especially since Catholic scientists, or at least Jesuit scientists, omitted nature from their scheme of illumination and gave sense experience a subsidiary role. If one studies only the visual use of the Lights of Reason and Nature, it does seem as if a division along sectarian lines is apparent and meaningful. But one should always remember that even if light metaphors can be divided up on the basis of religion, that is not necessarily true of scientists. There were a number of important figures in the Scientific Revolution who came to believe that the evidence of the senses is as important, and as valid, as the workings of the intellect in establishing scientific knowledge, and they showed no propensity for any particular sect or creed. Since this is a paper about images, I will argue this important and final point by referring to two more title-page engravings, although I will have to depart from the world of light metaphors to do so.
Jan Hevelius published his Selenographia in 1647, the year after Kircher's Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae. The timing is significant, for on the title page Hevelius seemed to take direct aim at the assertions of Kircher and Scheiner that sense was an order of knowledge inferior to reason. The title page (not illustrated here) is dominated by two large standing figures. Alhazen is at the left, with a ray-tracing diagram in his hand, and Galileo is on the right, holding a telescope. On an obvious level they represent the sciences of optics and astronomy; but they mean something more here, and since that meaning might not be obvious, the artist provided further identification. On the plinth beneath Alhazen's feet is a tiny vignette of a skullcap and the word ratione (by reason). On Galileo's plinth is an eye and the wordsensu (by sense). Alhazen and Galileo epitomize reason and sense. For the Jesuits, reason and sense were only two of the four sources of knowledge, and they stood on different levels. For Hevelius, they are the only two sources of truth, and they have equal status. What was Hevelius' religious affiliation? No one seems to know for sure. He was certainly religious, but more detail is lacking in both his own works and those of his biographers. Whatever his theological views, they were unobtrusive, and it seems certain that his exaltation of sense had little to do with either Scholastic or Reformist views of epistemology.
The second example, or counterexample, is the frontispiece to a book published in 1670, Agostino Scilla's La Vana Speculazione disingannata dal Senso (see fig. 7 ). Scilla was more obviously a Catholic, but he was a Neapolitan Catholic, which is not quite the same thing. His fossil treatise, which has languished in the shadow of the masterpiece of Nicolaus Steno, is a quite remarkable defense of the organic origin of fossils; but the frontispiece is even more remarkable in the light of the metaphors we have been pursuing. Scilla, not so incidentally, was an artist and seems to have designed the engraving himself. The illustration shows an outdoor scene; not much of the landscape is visible except for a slope in the right foreground that is littered with fossils. The rest of the space is dominated by two figures, one wispy and wraith-like, with a tenuous hold on reality; the other solid and down-to-earth, with the eye of reason firmly embedded in his breast. What do they represent? The very title of the work provides the answer. The will-o'-the-wisp is Vain Speculation, and she is being disabused of her false preconceptions by Sense. Natural philosophers have maintained that fossils are sports of nature, productions of the earth; but the physical evidence proves that they are the remains of formerly living creatures. Sense has taken over the eye of reason and has become the principal arbiter of scientific truth. This frontispiece and that of Scheiner stand at opposite poles of the Catholic scientific experience.
Conclusion
The goals of this essay have been limited. First, I have tried to demonstrate that epistemological issues of seventeenth-century science were frequently expressed visually in title-page engravings, using imagery that is often revealing of the author's position. Second, I have tried to argue -in the specific case of the metaphors of the Lights of Reason and Nature and their accompanying Lights of Sense, Scripture, and Grace -that certain Protestant scientists used these metaphors differently from certain Catholics, and that these differences may reflect real differences in attitudes toward the interpretation of sense evidence. It is tempting to extrapolate these findings into a mini-Merton thesis: that Protestant scientists placed greater reliance on the direct study of nature, and this faith in the senses fostered one of the most important developments of the Scientific Revolution. I choose not to be so tempted, for reasons that I hope are obvious. I have dealt with two very limited subsets of Catholic and Protestant science: Jesuits, on the one hand, and alchemists, united here by forced marriage to Bacon, on the other. This is a skewed sample at best, and it cannot be unskewed, because there are no other title pages to examine; these two groups form the sum total of all seventeenth-century scientists whose title pages depicted the Lights of Reason and Nature in some form. Moreover, as I have tried to show with the examples of Hevelius and Scilla, there were Catholic scientists who avoided light metaphors but still placed great reliance on sense evidence; there were still others, such as Galileo and Descartes, who did not engage in metaphorical warfare at all and believed even more strongly in the importance of evidence derived from nature. So one cannot really draw any strong conclusions from this limited study. But I do suspect that if one were to analyze all of the epistemological images and metaphors from seventeenth-century title pages in the light of the authors' theological positions, then real sectarian differences might well emerge. Whether this would shed any light at all on the rise of modern science is, at this point, anyone's guess. 
